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ON GOD AND NECESSITY
Brian Leftow
My God and Necessity offers a theist a theory of modal truth. Two recent articles 
criticize the theory’s motivation and main features. I reply to these criticisms.
Theists have long thought about the relation between God and neces-
sary truth. The dominant tradition has offered what I call deity theories, 
holding that God’s nature makes necessary truths true or gives rise to 
their truthmakers—that the content of God’s nature, deity, is the ultimate 
reason that 2 + 2 = 4 or that hydrogen atoms have one proton. My God and 
Necessity argues that theists should consider a non-deity approach and 
develops one.1 Chris Tweedt has in this journal questioned my motivating 
arguments against the deity view; in the first part of this response I defend 
those arguments. I begin with a bit about motivation, then recap some of 
my arguments against deity theories and discuss Tweedt’s countermoves. 
William Craig’s review of my book (also in this journal) raises a number 
of questions about my non-deity proposal; the last parts of this response 
answer Craig’s objections.
Why Care?
One might wonder why anyone should care about the relation between 
God and necessary truth. Pastors picking up the phone at midnight rarely 
hear an anguished, “but what about mathematics?” Well, my animating 
thought is one at the core of Western theism: that God is the sole ultimate 
reality. I take this to imply inter alia that everything else—absolutely every-
thing else—in the ontological census is there because God put it there,2 
and whatever states of affairs do not trace to created free agency or the 
random action of created probabilistic causes, trace back to God somehow. 
This (I argue) includes even necessary states of affairs. The bulk of my 
book tries to show how best to explicate this.
Why a Deity Theory?
The dominant theist view, as noted above, has been that God’s nature is the 
ultimate reason necessary truths are true and necessary. This is a natural 
1Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Henceforth GN.
2Parsing is needed to avoid a limited form of occasionalism here. Consider it done.
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thought. If a truth is necessary, it’s natural to seek a necessarily available 
ground for it. God exists necessarily and necessarily has His nature. Plau-
sibly nothing else about God is necessary—everything necessary in God is 
His existence or an aspect of His nature. To classical and medieval authors, 
this was plausible due to a commitment to divine simplicity, which was 
usually taken to imply that there was nothing to God but His nature.3 To 
us this is plausible because we’ve learned to explicate nature and essence 
as e.g., the conjunction of all attributes an item has necessarily.4
What Is the Alternative?
There are other ways to think about the divine essence. Kit Fine suggests 
that being necessary is not sufficient for being essential.5 Fine suggests 
that while it is necessary to Socrates to belong to {Socrates}, it is not es-
sential to him. It is not tied to his identity in the right way.6 Aristotelians 
would say that it is necessary but not essential to me to have a sense of 
humor: a sense of humor does not make me who or what I am. Suppose 
we say that deity is just the property that makes God divine, that makes 
Him who or what He is. Then plausibly deity is not all there is to God: 
God has chosen to make you, but surely it does not make Him who or 
what He is to have chosen this. Further, on a Finer-grained approach to 
deity, there is room for the thought that some things in God are necessary 
but not part of deity, and for contentful stories about how they get to be 
necessary. We are free to look outside deity for a necessary ground in God 
for at least some necessary truth.
An Argument against Deity Theories
I think we should, for I am not sure that deity more narrowly understood 
can really ground all necessary truth. It seems to me that deity has just one 
ontological job. Just as having redness makes one red and having dog-
hood makes one a dog, having deity makes one divine.7 Just as redness’s 
only job is making red, deity’s only job is making divine. So (I submit) if 
one has deity, that makes true of one just things that help make one divine. 
Now on a deity theory, deity provides a truthmaker for every necessary 
truth, and so for < water = H2O >.
8 So on a deity theory, water’s being H2O 
is part of deity’s content. But in fact, I submit, it is not. Water’s being H2O 
doesn’t help make one divine. It doesn’t help make God what or who He 
3See e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, 3.
4For background, see Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives 8 (1994), 
1–16. 
5Fine, “Essence and Modality.”
6Ibid.
7By making one divine, it makes one God, or so I argue: as I see it, deity is an individual 
essence (GN, 206–208). That does not matter for present purposes.
8Here I introduce a convention: “< P >” names the proposition that P.
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is. So (I conclude) < water = H2O > is not something having deity makes 
true: strike one against deity theories.
Tweedt writes against this that
the description of deity that contains only what is necessary for making God 
divine is general enough to exclude . . . the truths it truthmakes. In giving an 
account of deity, we could even say “Deity truthmakes all necessary truths,” 
without mentioning [specific truths]. This generality nevertheless entails 
that deity requires certain necessary truths like [< water = H2O >]. Similarly, 
in our account of what is necessary to make God divine, we could say “God 
knows all truths” without mentioning [< water = H2O >], . . . and this too . . . 
guarantees that deity requires certain necessary truths like [< water = H2O >]. 
. . . If an account of deity theory were to include specifics about everything 
that makes God divine, the truthmaker for . . . every . . . necessary truth 
would be given in this account.9
The truthmaker for < water = H2O > is water’s being H2O. So all this seems 
just bald denial of one of my premises. Tweedt just asserts without argu-
ment that if we but knew it, water’s being H2O helps make God divine. 
And what he says to flesh the denial out has problems.
There are two broad ways to parse < God knows all truths >, and neither 
does for Tweedt what he wants it to. One parsing specifies a domain for 
“all,” or at least commits us to a particular domain too large for us to 
specify. This way brings each individual truth into the content of < God 
knows all truths >. That God knows all truths, so understood—that He 
knows all these truths—is contingent if there are any contingent truths. 
For if there are, it is contingent that “all” has the particular domain it 
does: it is contingent that God knows all these. But it is not contingent 
that God is divine. Again, if knowing all these truths were part of what 
makes someone divine, then necessarily, if there is a divine being, it knows 
just these truths—and so there is no possible world in which there is a 
divine being and you had a different egg for breakfast today. Surely that’s 
false. So knowing all truths, understood as knowing all of just these, is 
not included in deity. It is at best a contingent realizer of part of deity, and 
knowing all necessary truths is at best necessarily part of any such realizer.
Another way to parse < God knows all truths > does not specify a do-
main or commit to a specific domain. Knowing all truths in this sense goes 
into being divine: it is part of being divine to know all truths, whatever the 
domain of “all” turns out to be. It does not thereby go into being divine 
that anything in particular be true, as no particular truth is built into the 
content of “all truths.” This applies even to necessary truths.10
9Chris Tweedt, “Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro’s Modal Relative,” Faith and Philosophy 
30 (2013) (henceforth “Tweedt”), 211–212.
10Counter-argument: parsed the second way, < God knows all truths > has a disjunction 
of domains. It is essential to God to know all truths, in the sense that it is essential to Him 
to know either all propositions true in possible world W1, or all those true in W2, or . . . But 
then by supervaluation over the possible domains, it is part of His essence to know all neces-
sary truths. Reply: distinguish the modal from the Finer-grained senses of “essence” and 
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Thus, knowing all truths does not provide a way being divine “requires” 
that water = H2O. Further, were we to read the claim that deity truthmakes 
all necessary truths in parallel with the way knowing all truths goes into 
being divine, here too there would be no way being divine “required” that 
water = H2O. That can’t be right. Truthmakers’ existing does “require” that 
specific truths be true. That is the whole point of them. Further, the omni-
science analogy, parsed this way, suggests that though it is part of being 
divine to be the primary truthmaker for whatever the necessary truths 
happen to be, deity does not include what those truths are or determine 
this out of its own resources. If deity does not settle the content of neces-
sary truth by itself, from its own resources, it is settled from outside deity. 
That is just incompatible with a deity theory.
Tweedt might want to suggest that only the “generalities” about deity 
are deifying—that the truthmakers for every specific necessary truth are 
in deity, but are not part of what makes God divine. If this is so, deity has 
more intrinsic content than the way a thing is in virtue of being divine (the 
divine-making properties) and what is true of deity as entity (e.g., that it is 
a property). This would make deity unique among properties. The intrinsic 
content of a particular shade of red, for instance, is just what it is to be that 
shade and that it is a color-property (etc.). Why should deity be different? 
Alternately, Tweedt might be denying that deity gives God everything 
necessary for being divine—saying that being divine “requires,” but does 
not include, making it true that water = H2O, perhaps as being triangular 
“requires” but does not include being trilateral. But being triangular does 
“deity.” Taking “essence” merely as the conjunction of God’s necessary properties, the reply 
is trivially correct, at least if you believe in supervaluation. But this does not suffice to show 
that knowing these truths is part of what makes God divine, i.e., part of God’s Fine-grained 
essence, deity. For there is an alternative it does not rule out—that it is part of God’s Fine-
grained essence to know whatever propositions turn out to be true, but something in God 
other than His deity determines which propositions are necessarily true. On this alternative, 
that God knows that water = H2O traces partly to deity and partly to something else in God. 
And on this alternative, this something else could have the degree of freedom about what 
turns out to be necessary that my view ascribes to it—on which see below.
Tweedt could have appealed instead to omnipotence. He could have suggested that it 
is Fine-essential to God to be omnipotent, and that while we do broad-brush the content of 
omnipotence by saying “God can do all things,” we flesh this out with e.g., “God can at t 
bring about all states of affairs it is broad-logically possible to bring about at t,” and could 
add further flesh by specifying all the states of affairs God can bring about. We might then 
say: God is omnipotent and has the power to make only water that is H2O. He would not be 
omnipotent were there any other sort of water that He could not make. So His natural om-
nipotence is the ground of the truth that water = H2O and its necessity, and in this way, that 
water = H2O is part of His nature, present there to make it true that water = H2O. I would have 
replied in the same way, though: it is Fine-essential to God to be able to bring about whatever 
can be brought about. But fleshed-out omnipotence is not Fine-essential to God, and perhaps 
not essential at all. I would argue that it is not Fine-essential to God that there are any times. 
Even aside from this, what can be brought about at t does not depend entirely on God’s Fine-
essence. I do not think God can change the past. If He cannot, there are things that can be 
brought about at earlier times that broad-logically cannot be brought about at later times: it is 
broad-logically impossible now that anyone, even God, bring it about that the Poles defeated 
the Germans in 1939, though God could have brought this about in 1939. Here again we have 
just a realizer, and the rest of my story goes as with omniscience. 
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give a triangle everything “required” for being a triangle. Though it can be 
nominally defined without mentioning trilaterality, trilateral is part of the 
way a thing is in virtue of being triangular. Being human does give me ev-
erything “required” for being human. Though it can be nominally defined 
without mentioning that I am three-dimensional, three-dimensional is 
part of the way a thing is in virtue of being human. So if Tweedt means to 
deny that deity gives God everything needed to be divine, this too would 
make deity unique among properties. Tweedt gives no reason we should 
expect deity to be unique in either way.
Another Argument against Deity Theories
Consider the claim that
1. if (it is untrue that water = H2O )  →  then God does not exist.
(1) is true simply because it has an impossible antecedent. We are sure of 
this because the antecedent’s impossibility suffices to explain (1)’s truth 
and (1)’s antecedent appears irrelevant to its consequent. (If water goes 
down, why should it take God with it?) Thus (1) is true trivially, as are all 
impossible-antecedent strict conditionals, but only trivially. But suppose 
that a deity theory is true. Then if God exists, deity provides a truthmaker 
for < water = H2O >. If < water = H2O > has a truthmaker, it is true. So on a 
deity theory, if God exists, < water = H2O > is true. So on a deity theory, if it 
is untrue that water = H2O, God does not exist. Thus on a deity theory, (1) 
reflects a fact about the divine nature (that deity provides a truthmaker for 
< water = H2O >). So (1)’s truth is overdetermined. Unintuitively, it is true 
for substantive as well as trivial reasons. Further, a truth-to-truthmaker 
connection provides a hidden link between (1)’s antecedent and conse-
quent. Unintuitively, (1)’s antecedent is relevant to its consequent. Strike 
two against deity theories.11
Tweedt’s Analogies
Tweedt uses two analogies to contest this argument. Tweedt’s first analogy 
asks us to consider the Proposition Theory of Meaning, the theory that a 
sentence is meaningful iff it expresses a proposition.12 Tweedt argues for 
what I’ll call a metaphysical and an epistemic claim. The metaphysical 
claim is that if the Proposition Theory were true, the meaningfulness of 
apparently unconnected sentences would in fact be connected, just as if a 
deity theory were true, the truth of apparently unconnected truths would 
be connected.13 Equivalently, just as a deity theory makes (1) a substantive 
truth, the Proposition Theory makes e.g.
2. if “water is H2O” is meaningless  →  “7 is prime” is meaningless
11So GN, chap. 8. 
12Tweedt, 209–211. 
13Ibid., 209.
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a substantive truth. Tweedt’s epistemic claim is that (2)’s antecedent and 
consequent “should seem connected” to someone “not ignorant of” the 
Proposition Theory.14 So too, Tweedt then suggests, someone “not ig-
norant of” deity theories should see (1)’s antecedent and consequent as 
connected. The metaphysical claim is there to support the epistemic claim: 
it’s because the theory connects antecedent and consequent that these 
“should seem connected” to someone “not ignorant of” the theory.
I shortly argue that Tweedt does not manage to support his meta-
physical claim, and that his epistemic claim is likely false. But I first make 
a more basic point: Tweedt is going for the wrong sort of conclusion. 
My argument was against accepting a theory. Suppose that if one adds 
a theory to one’s background beliefs (or at least the hypotheses one is 
“not ignorant of”), this should alter one’s impressions of which truths are 
connected. How does that bear on whether one should accept the theory? 
False background beliefs (or entertained hypotheses) can contribute to 
misleading impressions. The only way to judge whether the impression is 
misleading is to assess the evidence for and against the theory, not to con-
sider whether the theory “should” make one see the world a certain way. 
What Tweedt should have argued is that independent of a deity theory, we 
do or should see (1) as non-trivial or not a paradox of strict implication, or 
that we do see (1) as I say but this doesn’t really support my conclusion, 
or that we do see (1) as I say and this does support my conclusion, but 
other, stronger intuitions should overrule this.
Tweedt’s First Analogy: Metaphysical Claim
That said, I now turn Tweedt’s case. His argument for his metaphysical 
claim is this15:
3. “Water is H2O” is meaningful iff it expresses some proposition. (by 
Proposition Theory)
4. “7 is prime” is meaningful iff it expresses some proposition. (by 
Proposition Theory)
5. If anything expresses a proposition, “water is H2O” does. (premise)
6. “Water is H2O” is meaningless. (premise for conditional proof)
7. “Water is H2O” does not express a proposition. (3, 6)
8. No sentence expresses a proposition. (5, 7)
9. “7 is prime” does not express a proposition. (8, UI)
10. “7 is prime” is meaningless. (4, 9)
11. “Water is H2O” is meaningless  → “7 is prime” is meaningless. (6–10, 
CP)
14Ibid., 210.
15Ibid., 209–210.
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That is, given the Proposition Theory and (5), (2) follows. As the theory 
and (5) are substantive, were the Proposition Theory true, Tweedt con-
cludes, it would “show” that (2) is substantive and true, counter to initial 
intuition.16
I find (5) problematic. Tweedt takes (5) as “the analogue of” 
< □(water = H2O) >.
17 He does so because he expresses < □(water = H2O) > by 
the sentence
S. If anything has a truthmaker, < water = H2O > has a truthmaker.
18
Now Tweedt does not say what kind of conditional (S) is supposed to 
express. To get necessity into its content, we must take (S) to express
12. Something has a truthmaker → <  water = H2O > has a truthmaker.
A mere material conditional won’t do. So if it is to parallel (S), “if anything 
expresses a proposition, ‘water = H2O’ does” must express
13. Something expresses a proposition → “water = H2O” does.
But (13) is false. There are worlds in which languages express proposi-
tions, but “water = H2O” is not a well-formed string of any language. If 
(13) is false and is the right rendering of (5), Tweedt’s argument is un-
sound. If instead of (13) one offers
13a. Something expresses a proposition → “water = H2O” does,
not only do we lose the analogy to < □(water = H2O) >, but Tweedt’s argu-
ment to (2) won’t yield a strict conditional. But (2) is a strict conditional. So 
if it includes (13a), the argument to (2) is invalid.
Does the problem with (13) matter? Here is an argument that it doesn’t. 
(2) is false. In some possible worlds, “water is H2O” is a sentence of a 
language and “7 is prime” is not. Since (2) is a strict implication, given S5, 
(2) is in fact necessarily false. The truth of the Proposition Theory could 
not alter this. So the analogy has to be read roughly this way: assume that 
the Proposition Theory is true. Then follow it where it leads. It then turns 
out that (2)’s antecedent does imply its consequent, due to the Proposi-
tion Theory, and so the two are substantively connected, by the assumed 
truth of the Proposition Theory. So if we accept a model in which both (2) 
and the Proposition Theory are true, it will emerge that the Proposition 
Theory provides a substantive explanation of (2)’s truth.19 You might say: 
we might as well add that in the model, (13) is true. We’re already dealing 
in impossibilities. One more won’t hurt.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., 209.
18Ibid., 210.
19Here I’m indebted to correspondence with Tweedt.
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However, the argument for (2) is a conditional proof: it tries to show 
(2) by assuming (2)’s antecedent and deriving (2)’s consequent. For a 
conditional proof to be sound, the premises it invokes other than the 
conditional’s antecedent must be true. Because it is a conditional proof 
about consequences of the Proposition Theory, we can take the Proposi-
tion Theory as one more “assumed” part of the proof. But the argument 
is not sound unless the rest of the premises are true. (13) is not. So the 
conditional proof is unsound. So it does not in fact derive the conditional: 
Tweedt does not show that the Proposition Theory gets us to (2).
Again, Tweedt needs an argument from (2)’s antecedent to its conse-
quent whose premises are just (2)’s antecedent and the Proposition Theory. 
The Proposition Theory is what links (2)’s antecedent to its consequent 
only if the Proposition Theory plus (2)’s antecedent imply (2)’s consequent. 
No implication, no link, so no substantive link. Tweedt shows that the con-
junction (“water is H2O” is meaningless . Proposition Theory . (13)) yields 
that “7 is prime” is meaningless. This would entail that (“water is H2O” is 
meaningless . Proposition Theory) implies that “7 is prime” is meaningless 
only if (13) were a thesis or a consequence of the Proposition Theory or a 
necessary truth. (P implies Q just if P in conjunction with a necessary truth 
implies Q.) (13) is none of these. So Tweedt does not have an argument 
from (2)’s antecedent plus the Proposition Theory to (2)’s consequent. So 
his reasoning is insufficient to back the metaphysical claim, particularly as 
it remains a live option that (13) is what really generates the antecedent-
consequent connection, or at least is a substantive necessary condition of 
there being one.
Tweedt’s First Analogy: Epistemic Claim
This matters to Tweedt’s epistemic claim. If the Proposition Theory does 
not create a substantive connection between < “water is H2O” is meaning-
less > and < “7 is prime” is meaningless >, even in the model, it can’t be true 
that someone believing the theory and the model “should” see one. The 
most such a person “should” see is a connection between (Proposition 
Theory . (13)) and there being a substantive connection. John has looked 
at Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, seen a duck, and never even considered 
whether there is also a rabbit in the picture. Jane suggests that there may 
be. Now that John is “not ignorant of” this possibility (Tweedt’s phrase), 
he may look and see one too; in fact he “should” see one, because it is 
there.20 There is no rabbit in a face-on portrait of Daffy Duck. A rabbit-
theory of Daffy Duck could not create one. So even if Jane suggests this to 
John, John should not see one there. So if Tweedt cannot show his meta-
physical claim, he cannot show his epistemic claim either.
20The illustration is Tweedt’s, in correspondence.
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Tweedt’s Second Analogy
Tweedt’s other proposed analogy invokes the “possibility axiom,” the claim 
that p is possible iff p is true at some possible world. He wants to use it to
establish the . . . prima facie unconnected conditional:
14. If it is not possible that 7 is prime, then it is not possible that President 
Obama is in China.
By the possibility axiom, it is possible that 7 is prime if and only if [at] some 
possible world . . . < 7 is prime >. . . . Further, it is possible that President 
Obama is in China if and only if [at] some possible world . . . < President 
Obama is in China >. . . . Let’s assume it is not possible that 7 is prime.
Further, let’s assume:
A. if anything is true at a possible world, < 7 is prime > is.
It follows that nothing is true at any possible world. If [so], then < President 
Obama is in China > is not true at a possible world. So it is not possible that 
President Obama is in China. . . . [T]he possibility that 7 is prime seems 
prima facie unconnected to the possibility that President Obama is in China 
only if we are ignorant of the possibility axiom.21
Now when a deity theory creates a substantive connection that links (1)’s 
antecedent and consequent, we can say of what sort that is: truth-to-truth-
maker. We can say why the theory alone makes the connection substantive: 
because it makes deity (or God’s having deity, or etc.) a truthmaker for 
< water = H2O >. This is why it seems that if the theory is true, what makes 
the theory true is what creates the substantive connection. However, even 
given the “axiom,” I do not see of what sort the substantive link between 
(14)’s antecedent and its consequent is supposed to be. (Tweedt’s first 
analogy has the same problem.) Further, it is not the “axiom” that makes 
the connection (supposedly) substantive. If we remove the “axiom” and 
adjust (A) accordingly, we get:
Assume it is not possible that 7 is prime.
Further, assume: if anything is possible, < 7 is prime > is.
It follows that nothing is possible.
If nothing is possible, then < President Obama is in China > is not pos-
sible.
This works as well or badly as Tweedt’s argument. The “axiom” thus 
looks like a non-load-bearing wall; if we knock it out, the structure still 
stands. If it is non-load-bearing, it is not what bears the load of there being 
a substantive connection. It is not what creates one, if there is one. Further, 
given S5, there is an analogue of (A) for any possibly true proposition. So 
21Ibid. “14” and “A” are not in Tweedt’s original; I have inserted them to smooth discus-
sion. 
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if Tweedt’s metaphysical claim about the “axiom” and (14) is true, it is for 
parallel reasons true that S5 creates a substantive connection between the 
antecedent and consequent of all (14)-like conditionals. I believe that S5 is 
the correct logic for metaphysical modality, and I see no reason to believe 
in these connections, let alone that S5 somehow creates them. If they are 
not there, Tweedt’s metaphysical claim about the “axiom” is false.
Against the Epistemic Claim
Tweedt’s analogies do not yield his metaphysical claim. But even if they 
worked, they would not yield his epistemic claim, i.e., show that if we 
accept the Proposition Theory or a deity theory, we “should” see a con-
nection between (2)’s or (1)’s antecedent and consequent. I have said that 
a deity theory does not in fact make us see one, and lacks the claim on our 
acceptance that a well-confirmed background scientific theory has.22 My 
point was this. Suppose that a scientific theory for which there is inde-
pendent evidence yields a conditional whose antecedent seems irrelevant 
to its consequent. Due to the irrelevance, the conditional seems unintui-
tive and implausible—unlikely to be true. But the evidence for the theory 
gives us reason to overrule our impression that the conditional should not 
be true. The conditional considered in itself seems no more plausible. The 
antecedent does not seem more relevant to the consequent. The theory 
does not change how they seem to us, initially and prima facie, considered 
in themselves. But the evidence on behalf of the theory that yields the 
conditional is sufficient reason to overlook how they seem to us. There is 
(I claimed) no such evidence on behalf of a deity theory. There is nothing 
to make us overrule our impression. That a deity theory implies that (1)’s 
antecedent and consequent have a hidden substantive connection thus 
remains just a strike against the theory.23
If I were a deity theorist, I would continue to find the claim that there 
is a substantive connection between (1)’s antecedent and consequent sur-
prising and unintuitive. I would simply think I had reason to overlook 
this. I might say to myself, “of course that’s so, given the theory.” I would 
not say to myself, “of course that’s so.” That I accept an explanation of 
something initially implausible, and so apparently unlikely, on which it 
does not count as unlikely, does not change the fact that considered in 
itself, apart from the explanation, it appears or is unlikely. Let’s say that 
I’m a first-century atheist. I meet a remarkable preacher. Later I watch 
him die, crucified. A few days after that, we meet and converse. It would 
explain this well that there is a God and the one I’m speaking to is the 
Messiah. I thus become a theist. I accept an explanation for the resurrec-
tion. But it does not cease to be unlikely considered in itself that a man 
rose from the dead. Nor “should” it. That Q is probable conditional on P 
has no bearing on how probable Q is or seems apart from P. Tweedt may 
22GN, 238.
23Thus Tweedt misreads me at 207.
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think that if one comes to accept a deity theory, one “should” view (1) 
only in light of that theory and so “should” come to see it simply as un-
surprising, as plausible. That would be like saying that Christians should 
not find it surprising that a man rose from the dead—that though it was 
a miracle and almost entirely unprecedented, Christians should not ap-
preciate these facts about it.
I take it, then, that my arguments for considering an alternative to deity 
theories are unscathed.24 I now briefly state my alternate view and take up 
Craig’s discussion of it.
The View
Suppose that, as my arguments suggest, not all necessary truths are 
written into the nature of God. Say that it is not part of deity for water to 
be H2O, or for there to be such a property as being water. If not, then either 
there is such a property independent of God—which I reject—or water 
must be something God dreamed up, something God simply invented, un-
compelled and unconstrained by anything. As I see it, God is so radically 
creative that He not merely created water ex nihilo, He thought up water ex 
nihilo. God creatively thought up the very natures of candidate creatures, 
and the states of affairs in which they figure. Our creativity can add only 
to the concrete and to history. We think we have genuinely new ideas, but 
even if they do not just rearrange particulars and attributes met in experi-
ence, God had them first. At the origin of all things, God (I claim) really did 
have completely new ideas, not prefigured in His nature. Further, having 
24I give one more argument. Tweedt misreads it—the referee’s rendering at 208n12 is 
closer—and so I will not state or discuss it.
The argument from (1) is subject to a (to me) more worrying counter than Tweedt’s. 
On my view, something necessary in God is the primary truthmaker for < water = H2O >. 
The counter is that one can substitute “something necessary in God” for “deity” in the 
argument from (1) and get a pretty good parallel to the argument against deity theories. It 
runs as follows: intuitively, (1) is only trivially true. But on my view, if God exists, some-
thing necessary in God provides a truthmaker for < water = H2O >. If < water = H2O > has a 
truthmaker, it is true. So on my view, if God exists, < water = H2O > is true. So on my view if 
it is untrue that water = H2O, God does not exist. Thus on my view, (1) reflects a fact about 
God (that something necessary in God provides a truthmaker for < water = H2O >). So (1)’s 
truth is overdetermined, substantive as well as trivial, and (1)’s antecedent is relevant to 
its consequent. Strike one against my non-deity theory, and so (since there is a parallel 
strike against deity theories) against all theist theories. For one way to respond to this, 
see GN, 241–242. I now briefly gesture at another: even though that in God which makes 
it true is necessarily there, in my technical sense of “in God,” it is in God not to have 
it there, for it is in God never to have thought up water at all. (For this technical sense 
see GN, 252–253; for a better explanation than GN’s, see my “Reply to Bohn,” European 
Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 3 (2014), 49–57.) Thus it is in God to exist even if it is 
untrue that water = H2O. This is enough to render (1) trivial—trivial because true only due 
to the semantics of conditionals rather than reflecting the way the facts about what it is in 
God to have be the case negate any real dependence of God’s existence on water’s being 
H2O. For allied reasons, (1)’s antecedent is not relevant to its consequent. While the prime 
truthmaker for < water = H2O > is something necessarily in God, it is not something God’s 
existence depends on (unlike deity). So it is not something whose lack could in any way 
explain God’s non-existence, and so its lack would not be a relevant factor to appeal to were 
we trying to explain that.
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thought up “secular” states of affairs—those that in no way involve God, 
distinctively divine attributes, etc.—it was up to Him what their modal 
status would be.
Now powers are things that can bring about effects. If a power can bring 
a state of affairs about, the state of affairs can obtain: it is possible. Power 
implies possibility. So “before” God thought up dogs, “before” dogs were 
possible, He had a general power to create, but not a specific power to 
create dogs.25 If God then makes it possible that there be dogs, He also 
gives Himself a specific power to make dogs.26 Or rather, say I, God em-
powers Himself to make dogs, and by so doing makes them possible.27 
However, as I see it, God’s creativity does not extend to logic, mathematics 
or His own nature.28 On these I agree with the deity theorists.
Craig’s Critique
Craig writes that
if it is up to God . . . freely to assign . . . modal status . . . then God . . . was 
able to . . . decide differently . . . and could have. . . . But on Leftow’s theory 
. . . it is impossible that God have done . . . differently.29
Craig’s suppressed premise is that one acts freely at t only if at t it is pos-
sible that one do otherwise. Without this Craig cannot infer from freedom 
in that act to alternate possibilities for that act. But even many libertar-
ians have denied Craig’s premise—e.g., Robert Kane,30 Eleonore Stump,31 
Laura Ekstrom32 and James Lamb.33 So it is not particularly outré to do so.
Again, Craig writes that
if it is up to God . . . freely to assign . . . modal status . . . then God . . . was 
able to do so, had the power to do so, and could . . . But on Leftow’s theory 
all that is false. God lacked the power to . . . make dogs possible.34
25Read “before” here non-temporally, as relative to an order of explanation, or a purely 
causal order, or an order of presupposition. 
26If He is to be omnipotent, then once dogs are possible, He must be able to make them.
27Obviously, this broad picture has to be modified in various ways to deal with problem-
cases. GN spends a lot of time on that.
28These are not secular: see GN, 251.
29William Craig, review of God and Necessity, Faith and Philosophy 30 (2013) (henceforth 
“Craig”), 466. 
30Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39–43.
31Eleonore Stump, “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” 
in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternative Possibili-
ties,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
32Laura Ekstrom, Free Will (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 211–213.
33James Lamb, “Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” 
Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993), 517–527.
34Craig, 466. 
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To treat the power to make dogs possible, I first discuss the power to think 
dogs up, then the power to make them possible once they are in the divine 
mind. I say that it is up to God to invent whatever secular states of affairs 
there are. Craig suggests that if so, He had the power to do so. I agree, 
in a way, but it matters just what that way is. My theory makes God the 
author not just of created reality, but of its vocabulary of properties: He 
makes up the very language in which He and we write history. There is 
for most theist thinkers a correlation between God’s concepts and proper-
ties: as most hold that He exists and is omniscient necessarily, for most, 
necessarily there is a property F iff God has a concept of F-hood. I say that 
this correlation is due to a connection: God establishes what properties 
there are by forming His concepts.35 In particular, God made up doghood. 
Before thinking it up, God had a general power to conceive creatively ex 
nihilo, that unique power by which He adds the truly new to the abstract 
fabric of things—henceforth simply the power to conceive. Once doghood 
exists, we can call this a power to conceive doghood, if we wish: it is the 
power from which doghood came. But “before” God thought up doghood, 
no-one, not even He, could have called it that. To call it that, one would 
need the concept of doghood, and before He first formed that concept, 
there was no such thing.
Because there was no such concept, at that point there could not be, in 
addition to the general power to conceive, a specific power to conceive 
doghood. A power to conceive doghood includes the concept of doghood 
or doghood itself in its makeup, and so an ingredient was lacking. In fact, 
there could not at any point be a specific power to conceive doghood cre-
atively ex nihilo. That power would include in its makeup, prior to its use, 
the doghood only its use is supposed to account for. If a specific power to 
conceive doghood exists, doghood or the concept of doghood is already 
there, and so that power’s use cannot account ex nihilo for there being 
either. But that is what a specific power to conceive doghood ex nihilo 
would do. So the power’s mere being there would prevent the power from 
bringing about what it is supposedly a power to bring about: it would be 
a necessarily self-blocking power. There is no such thing.
There could not be a specific power to conceive doghood creatively ex 
nihilo. But it doesn’t follow that God had no power to do so. It doesn’t take 
a specific power with doghood in its makeup to do this. Rather, God had 
the only power needed: the power to conceive creatively. It just is the na-
ture of creativity to add something new to reality, and of perfect creativity 
to add something completely new. If we ask why His use of that power 
yielded doghood, if it was not a specific power to conceive doghood, the 
answer is: it just did. God just did think doghood up. Explanation stops 
here, at an undetermined use of His power to add something completely 
35In fact, I reduce properties to divine concepts, and then eliminate divine concepts. But 
that’s a long story not needed here; I talk about properties, concepts and “abstract reality” 
to ease exposition.
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new to abstract reality, just as the explanation of concrete created reality 
stops ultimately at God’s undetermined use of His power to choose (and 
so add something completely new to concrete reality).
Once God has doghood in mind, it is then up to Him whether it is to 
be possible. I treat the power to make dogs possible as I treat the power to 
conceive them. “Before” God thought up dogs, there could not be such a 
power. There were just the general powers God would use to make any-
thing possible: His powers to conceive, to permit Himself to do things and 
to specify His general powers (e.g., to create) by thinking up creatures and 
permitting Himself to make them (thus yielding e.g. a specific power to 
make dogs). Once God had doghood in mind, He had the power to make it 
possible. For dogs did not run afoul of His natural biases against the contra-
logical and -mathematical and the too-bad-to-permit (of which more anon), 
and so one thing He then had a specific, particular, all-things-considered 
power to do was to permit Himself to make dogs.36 If He did permit this, 
that would give Him the all-things-considered power to make dogs. The 
existence of this power would make dogs possible. So once God thought 
up dogs, He had the power to make them possible. As with thinking dogs 
up, we can retrospectively (so to speak) call the general powers God had 
ab initio powers to make dogs possible, because they are the powers from 
which the possibility of dogs came.37 Craig asks whether God
can . . . prior to thinking up secular states of affairs, will to have the power 
to create dogs? . . . no, for [at that point] there is no such thing as doghood. 
Therefore, God at that moment is unable to will to have the power to create 
dogs. But [then] how does God manage to acquire that power?38
The answer is this: first God creatively thinks up doghood. At that point, 
with the equipment in hand, He can will to have the power to create dogs. 
He can consider the idea of doghood, decide that He likes it enough to 
permit dogs to exist, and give Himself the power to make them.
The S5 Dilemma
Craig also tries to add force to a problem I raise myself. In a nutshell: as 
I see it, God determines which secular states of affairs are to be possible. 
His preferences guide this. I argue that He could have had different pref-
erences. I also argue that He could not have determined different secular 
states of affairs to be possible.39 It is impossible that there be other “broadly 
36A power is all-things-considered just if all one has to do to use it is try to do so. A 
power fails to be all-things-considered if there are circumstances that would prevent one 
from using it if one tried. At the moment, I have an all-things-considered power to type. If 
I were chained to a wall, out of reach of my keyboard, I would have an intrinsic but not an 
all-things-considered power to type.
37I’m eliding a long story here.
38Craig, 467.
39In setting up the problem, Craig writes that for me “God was able to create something 
that is impossible” (468n8). He means only, I think, that for me God had the power to have 
something impossible come out possible instead, and that had it been possible, God would 
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logical” possibilities; as I see it, the right logic for broadly logical modality 
is S5, and I show that this result emerges naturally from my views. So for 
me, God necessarily makes the choices about possibility that He actually 
makes. So here is a problem I raise myself: on my view, other preferences 
are possible, preferences guide choices, but other choices about possibility 
are not possible—and these claims appear to be in tension.40 Craig sug-
gests that
Even were it true that if God had different preferences, He would choose the 
same possibilities . . . God, as a libertarian agent, still could choose differ-
ently. So there seems to be a genuine inconsistency here. . . . [On the other 
hand,] if we allow God’s preferences to constrain His choices too narrowly, 
then Leftow’s theory is in danger of collapsing into a deity theory.41
Now being a libertarian agent requires at most possibly choosing other-
wise on some occasion. One need not always have an alternate possibility 
to be a libertarian agent. The blessed in heaven are libertarian agents if 
they ever were, even if they can no longer choose to reject God; God is 
a libertarian agent in keeping a promise if He ever is one, even if He is 
not able to break the promise. So there is no inconsistency: an agent can 
be libertarian and yet in some situations or in some choices not possibly 
choose otherwise.42 Further, if God does not possibly choose otherwise, 
it does not follow that the preferences that lead to this result are dictated 
by what it is to be divine, and so it will take showing that there is a real 
danger of deity theory.
Still, there is a tight spot for me here, though Craig does not raise it 
well. What Craig wants to foreground, I think, is this: just how much 
does God’s nature constrain what He prefers to have possible? If God’s 
nature constrains His preferences entirely, i.e., determines them, we have 
an explanation for the S5 result. As His nature cannot differ, neither can 
His preferences. But then, as Craig suggests, we’ve collapsed into a deity 
theory. On the other hand, the less God’s nature constrains His preferences, 
have been able to create it. On my view it is never the case both that some state of affairs is 
impossible and that God can bring it about.
40GN, 406–407; the text here is a cleaner formulation.
41Craig, 468.
42I say that in the permitting which establishes secular modal facts, God is free “either in 
the strongest libertarian sense or in a strong analogue to this” (GN, 461). I cash this in with 
a claim that He is wholly undetermined in His choice and has it in Him to do otherwise. But 
on the technical sense I give “in Him,” this does not entail possibly doing otherwise. Craig 
dislikes my technical sense: “Leftow’s conditional definition of what it is to be ‘in God’ is 
equivalent to saying that God wills to have a particular power only if He has it. That seems 
to get the explanatory priority wrong, which suggests that material implication is too weak 
to serve the intended purpose here. The intention seems to be to make God’s willing to have 
a particular power explanatorily prior to His having it: He has it because He willed it; He 
doesn’t will it because He has it” (Craig, 467). But the conditional definition can equally be 
read as I intended, as that God is intrinsically such that if He wills to have it, He has it. The 
“if” version gets the priority right; the thought is that His nature is such that all He has to 
do to have the power is will to have it. There is no reason to prefer Craig’s equivalent, and 
charity rules against it. 
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the more widely His preferences might vary. The more widely they might 
vary, the harder it is to see why no matter what, they would lead God to 
the same decisions about possibility. If God is wholly rational, then in an 
unconstrained choice, as this one is, He follows His preferences. So it can 
seem that God’s preferences might vary only if God’s choice about possi-
bility might also vary. If that’s so, the mere fact that the preferences might 
vary seems to defeat the S5 claim. So it seems that I can have either the S5 
claim or the claim that God could have had different preferences, but not 
both. I now take this up. I first discuss why God would have made the 
same secular states of affairs possible no matter what His preferences, then 
show how I avoid collapse into a deity theory.
The S5 Story
Here’s my story. It was up to God what secular states of affairs there are. 
That is, it was His doing alone, subject to no external influence or internal 
compulsion, even by His nature. That this was up to Him, in the sense 
given, does not imply that this could have come out differently. For rea-
sons I develop, there would have been the same secular states of affairs 
no matter what. God’s dreaming these up is a stage in the explanation of 
secular modal status prior to God’s preferring some to others, so there is 
no issue about alternate preferences here.
States of affairs’ value-properties supervene on their non-value content. 
So no matter what, they have the same value-properties.43 So no matter 
what, God would have faced the same candidates for possibility, with the 
same value-properties. By His nature (I say), He rules out of possibility 
any that would be contra-logical or -mathematical. As to the rest, their 
value-properties guide His choice. As these would be the same no matter 
what, we’d get a different choice only if God’s all-things-considered pref-
erences so differed as to generate one.
God is morally perfect by nature. His preferences cannot affect this. So 
no matter what, He would have brought the same moral character to His 
choice. God is also evaluatively perfect by nature: there are non-moral sorts 
of value, and He perfectly appreciates differences in these. Again, this is 
not something His preferences can affect. So by nature, He disallows any 
state of affairs that is too bad objectively, i.e., any involving disvalue whose 
43At least, the same ones based purely on their intrinsic content. States of affairs stand in 
different relations in different worlds, thus have different extrinsic properties, and so may 
have different value-properties in different worlds based on these extrinsic properties. But 
then they and the states of affairs to which they are related form larger wholes to which these 
value properties are intrinsic, and these intrinsic value-properties, again, are the same in all 
possible worlds. One might argue that every state of affairs is related in some way to every 
other in a world (at least by co-obtaining), and so the only whole that has only value proper-
ties based on its purely intrinsic content is an entire possible world. Well, if so, still, a world 
has the same value properties in all worlds in which it exists. And in any case, I doubt that all 
relations in which states of affairs stand bring value or disvalue—co-obtaining being a prime 
example. So even if there are relations between every state of affairs in a world and every 
other, it may still be that small states of affairs are as if isolated from others, for the purpose 
of considering their value properties. 
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permission a perfectly good, evaluatively perfect God could not justify. A 
God necessarily perfect morally and evaluatively who had charge over 
the content of possible worlds would not let such disvalue be possible. 
For He lets it be possible only if it is possible that such a world be actual, 
i.e., only if it is possible that He permit this disvalue. If He is necessarily 
morally and evaluatively perfect, it is not possible that He permit it. Thus 
we have a third class of states of affairs God wouldn’t allow to be possible 
no matter what. The only remaining question is whether His preferences 
might contingently impose some further condition on possibility, beyond 
those of logic, mathematics and objective badness.
I do not claim to know God’s full policy on permitting to be possible. 
Craig takes it that on my view God finds some states of affairs evalu-
atively neutral and so “is indifferent as to their modal status.”44 A closer 
reading of the relevant pages would have found me to be undecided about 
whether any state of affairs is entirely neutral,45 to have argued that there 
are no overall neutral possible worlds,46 to have suggested that if there are 
intrinsically value-neutral non-divine portions of candidate worlds God 
would have an attitude toward them rather than being indifferent,47 and 
to have reasoned about how to treat absolutely neutral states of affairs “if 
such there be.”48
Again, Craig suggests that for me it is “perfectly consistent with God’s 
nature that He have decided that gold have a different atomic number.”49 
This requires a bit of discussion. If atomic numbers are not essential prop-
erties, other atomic numbers are not a problem. If they are essential, this 
ascribes to me something like Descartes’s notorious claim that God “was 
free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal.”50 But if 
they are essential, they are either definitionally or non-definitionally es-
sential: they either do or don’t figure in some truth of the form that to be 
gold is to be F. Suppose that gold has a definitional essence, and its atomic 
number is part of it: to be gold just is inter alia to have that atomic number. 
Then contra Craig, I hold explicitly that it is not in God even to conceive 
gold otherwise, let alone to decide this about it.51 Nothing He thought of 
differently could count as gold: different definition, different definiendum. 
For there is no pre-given property or concept whose definition God is 
trying to get right. Rather, God’s definition determines what the property 
44Craig, 468.
45GN, 374.
46Ibid., 375.
47Ibid.
48Ibid., 378.
49Craig, 468.
50Descartes to Mersenne, 3 June 1630, in Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, v. 3, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26.
51GN, 419.
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or concept is. This is a case of divine stipulative definition: gold is simply 
something God dreamed up.
Suppose on the other hand that gold’s atomic number is essential but 
not definitionally essential. Then what I say is this.52 Perhaps something 
with a different atomic number could have played just the role gold 
plays in a history indiscernible from ours save for this substitution. If so, 
perhaps that’s reason to say that gold could have had a different atomic 
number. Note that on this alternative, God does not decide that anything 
have a different essential property than it actually has. He merely decides 
which sort of thing to plug into a role. This isn’t even a distinctively modal 
decision; it’s one about what is to be actual. There is nothing paradoxical 
or counter-intuitive about allowing God this sort of decision.
I also say that it is in God to have not had His actual representation 
of gold, but have had instead some representation of an element dif-
fering in just one feature, one essential but not definitional to (say) gold 
atoms. Suppose that He did this, and the different feature were the atomic 
number. Then I explicitly take no stand on what we should say about it. 
Influenced by the similarity between the concepts, we might say that He 
had conceived gold differently—that this other concept is that of gold, 
slightly altered. On the other hand, we might think that even a concept 
which just specifies a list of essential properties for an element effectively 
has a definition, which is the conjunction of those properties, or (if we 
don’t think that) think that even a change in this non-definitional feature 
is enough to imply that this is not the same concept altered. Thinking 
this way, we might say that this would have been a different concept. 
These other alternatives suppose that God has simply had a different set 
of secular conceivings, which do not include His actual gold-concept. 
Here God isn’t deciding anything about gold. He hasn’t had His actual 
gold-concept; we are deciding what to say about this, and I make no rec-
ommendation. If you find it paradoxical to describe the situation as one 
in which God conceives gold with a different atomic number, nothing in 
my view forces you to describe it that way. I leave you free to say that I 
simply allow that it is in God not to have thought up gold, but to have 
thought up something else instead. Craig’s charge is just calumny. Add 
to this that I hold that God’s nature determines logical and mathematical 
truth and that states of affairs have goodness- and badness-properties by 
their relation to His nature, not His will,53 and it is clear that my view is 
not close to Descartes’s at all.
Again, I don’t claim to know how God decides what is to be possible. I 
can’t and don’t rule it out that He has access to considerations unknown 
to us, which make one unique selection of possibilities objectively best, 
52Ibid., 289–290.
53For Descartes’s denial of the last, see his Sixth Replies, in Cottingham et al., Philosophical 
Writings, v. 2, 291. 
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providing a sufficient reason for His choice.54 If that’s how it is, His per-
fectly rational, perfectly good nature would zero in on that no matter 
what. He would still be following preference in doing so. It would not be 
a natural preference, because it would not have been part of His nature 
that (say) it is uniquely best to have possibilities including that dogs exist. 
His nature alone would not determine Him to prefer the possibility of 
dogs, or completely explain this selection,55 because it would not have de-
termined that there were dogs to prefer. The preference He follows would 
be a preference determined by His nature in conjunction with content He 
just dreams up.
If that’s how it is, the S5 result follows. God is by nature rationally, 
morally and evaluatively perfect and a lover of all good. So no matter 
what, God would have faced the same value-facts as bases for choice and 
brought the same standards and relevant preferences to the choice: and so 
no matter what, there would have been the same possibilities. That God 
might have had different preferences doesn’t imply that His preferences 
might have differed in all respects. I first introduce the possibility of dif-
ferent preferences to make sense of His choice among possibilities, not the 
choice that establishes possibilities as possible.56 I’m committed to the pos-
sibility of the kind of difference that could explain the former, not of the 
kind of difference that would create a problem about the latter.57
Still, while I don’t claim to know God’s policy, one suggestion I take 
seriously is that God allows as possible any state of affairs that is not too 
bad objectively.58 The thought behind that is roughly this: God is a perfect 
lover of all good. God does as pleases Him, and objective goodness is what 
pleases Him. Once He has ruled out all that is too bad to tolerate, what 
remain are states of affairs objectively good enough for Him to permit. 
It is good that it be possible that something good be actual. We are glad 
to get lottery tickets as gifts because it is good that it be possible in the 
relevant sense that we win: giving a lottery ticket gives a good possibility, 
and a good possibility makes a good gift. God is not yet choosing what is 
to be actual. He is making the prior decision of what is to be possible. So 
it is open to Him to maximize the amount of this sort of good He has at 
this point. There is no downside to doing so. This obviously would also 
maximize the good involved in having a greater range of available good 
options. So I cannot see why He would not. That suggests that He would 
permit all that is not too bad to permit. Another line of reasoning tending 
this way: a God who loves all good would permit whatever is good enough 
54GN, 465.
55Ibid., 460.
56Ibid., 267–271.
57Still, if God’s mind is anything like ours, God consults His preferences at the point of His 
first choice, which is about the possible. God’s preferences get a look-in because He decides 
what to permit by what He approves of or likes.
58GN, 492.
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to permit. After all, it is good enough to permit, and He loves the good in 
it. It would be irrational to deprive Himself of the possibility of having 
something He loves, in this circumstance: having it takes no effort and 
imposes no cost on anyone else. That again suggests permitting all that 
is not too bad objectively to tolerate. This would be one way for a unique 
selection of possibilities to be objectively best.
If that’s how it goes, then again, the S5 result follows, since it is part 
of God’s nature to be a perfect lover of all good. If that is not how it goes, 
then there are states of affairs not too bad to permit which God does not 
permit. God permits everything objectively valuable or pleasing overall to 
at least degree n.59 (If He permits that P because its being the case that P is 
overall good or pleasing to at least degree n, and that Q would also be at 
least n good or pleasing, it would be irrational not also to permit Q.) But 
there is a gap between n and what is too bad to permit, and God does not 
permit what falls in the gap. Suppose this is so. Then the question is: could 
the value of n differ? If it could not, then again, the S5 result follows. But 
could it?
One might offer a Rowe-style argument against letting n differ: perhaps 
if God could have had a higher standard, preferred a bigger gap between 
n and the too-bad, He could have been more perfect. So if there is no world 
in which He could have been more perfect, there is no world in which His 
standard could have been higher, and if there is no world in which He 
could have been less perfect, there is none in which His standard could 
have been lower.60 I think this argument would be a wash, though; one 
could reply that a higher standard would show a lack of sensitivity to the 
genuine goodness in the low-value alternatives, and so a lower standard 
would not clearly be a defect. It’s one thing if God actualizes a low value 
alternative. That would need some explaining. It’s another for Him merely 
to appreciate that there is enough goodness in it not to be ruled out of 
consideration. As we’ve seen, some intuitions suggest that He should be 
maximally accommodating at this level.
We’re discussing divine preferences, not divine free choices. So that 
God is a libertarian agent has no bearing on this. Rather, we’re dealing 
in likes, tastes, being pleased by: the sort of brute reaction to things that 
in us is paradigmatically involuntary, emerging without choice or delib-
eration simply from our personality, attitudes and situation as they are 
when we meet a new thing. Further, we’re talking about the eliciting of 
God’s first non-natural preferences, and so no non-natural preferences 
are brought to this. Rather, no matter what, there would be same natural 
divine personality reacting to the same set of options, and that is all that 
would determine what God likes. If there is an ideal reaction to have, then 
59There might of course be multiple, incommensurable hierarchies of value here, and per-
haps no way to get a unique number to play the role I assign n here. All I’m doing is giving 
a toy model. The extra complications one might bring in wouldn’t affect my overall point.
60For Rowe’s original, see William Rowe, Can God Be Free? (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).
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being necessarily perfect, He would necessarily have it, and so again we 
have S5. But perhaps different reactions would be just different, not better 
or worse. 
We’re dealing with low-value candidate histories, and the thought that 
God might or might not find them not good enough to allow even to be 
possible. Our question is whether He might react in accord with different 
standards about what is intolerable. “Intolerable” is a strong evaluative 
reaction. The difference in value between just at the tolerability cutoff 
and just below it may be infinitesimal, but the difference in attitude elic-
ited seems large. Still, it need not be unwarranted. Surely some states of 
affairs are too bad for God to tolerate. These differ only infinitesimally 
from others not too bad. So if the difference in reaction is large, it can be 
warranted to base this large a difference in reaction on this small a dif-
ference, because it is warranted to tolerate the tolerable and not tolerate 
what is not.
The question, though, is whether this large a difference can be war-
ranted if one looks at the same state of affairs, with the same personality, 
in precisely the same situation. Would a perfectly rational, evaluatively 
perfect agent look at a state of affairs in one world and say “intolerable!,” 
and in another world, all other things being the same, say of it, “oh, OK, 
then”? The difference between the two reactions would be utterly brute. 
The greater the difference in reaction, the harder it is to view the difference 
as rational, whether or not either judgment in itself is rationally defective. 
Consider Inconstant Irving: if he meets Ravishing Rhonda on Monday he 
will find it intolerable to live without her and launch a campaign to win 
her hand, but if he meets her Tuesday in precisely the same circumstances, 
neither having changed intrinsically save for being a day older, he won’t 
find it intolerable: he’ll consider life without her, just say “oh, OK,” and 
wander off. Perhaps it is not rationally defective either to be swept away 
by or to be indifferent to Rhonda, but it points to something odd and argu-
ably defective about Irving’s personality that he can differ so. There can be 
nothing odd or defective about God’s personality.
That suggests that even if there is a gap between n and the too-bad, one 
expressing something about God’s personality beyond His natural rejec-
tion of the too-bad, we wouldn’t get a brute world-to-world difference at 
the level of choice about possibility. This reasoning doesn’t carry over to a 
choice about actuality, though. For what decides between candidates for 
actuality is not the difference between tolerable and intolerable, but (say) 
that between being liked best and being liked infinitesimally less than the 
best. Even an infinitesimal difference in liking from one world to the next 
would suffice to explain a different creative choice, and there is nothing 
irrational about an infinitesimal difference in liking, if one is the sort of 
personality who can so differ.61
61All this assumes that the difference in reaction between “intolerable” and “tolerable” is 
large. But one might question this. The difference between feeling something to be intoler-
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But now the other horn of the dilemma looms. If I have the S5 result, 
how do I avoid collapse into a deity theory, particularly if God’s nature 
determines that He is a perfect lover of all good, evaluatively perfect, etc.? 
Well, one option still on the table is that something in God not determined 
by the content of deity dictates some gap between n and the too-bad. Just 
as I can’t rule it out that His deity zeroes in on a unique objectively best 
selection of possibilities, I can’t rule it out that something expresses itself 
here which deity does not determine. But suppose that’s not so. Then we 
still avoid a deity theory because God’s nature doesn’t contain a stock of 
secular states of affairs or determine the stock of them He dreams up, in 
reaction to which He forms all-things-considered preferences. The objec-
tion I lodge against deity theories, in a nutshell, is that it isn’t plausible 
that God’s nature comes chock-full of creaturely natures. I don’t think that 
if we could just peer far enough into God’s nature, we’d see zebras, orang-
utangs etc. God’s nature is not a zoo. All God’s lions were born free: in 
God’s undetermined, unconstrained imagining. Perhaps His nature takes 
over in determining the possible once they’re there. But even if that’s so, 
the role I give God’s non-natural conceiving keeps me out of the deity-
theoretic camp.
Craig is not right, then, that “Leftow’s view, like Cartesianism, has a 
strong voluntaristic component.”62 On the contrary, the Preface’s first sen-
tence says, “to locate my position, start at Aquinas and take a half-step 
toward Descartes.”63 Aquinas is a paradigm deity theorist, and I meant 
“half-step.” Though not a deity theory, the view is not very far from one, 
and deity theorists could cheerfully accept a great deal of what I say in 
developing it.
Craig also tries to find a problem in this:
Leftow holds that . . . since God could not have dreamed up different secular 
states of affairs than He has, “God must have all and only the actual candi-
date histories in view.”64 This . . . seems incorrect. Take a physically possible 
universe . . . God could have preferred that such a world be impossible, in 
which case it is not one of the actual candidate histories.65
able and feeling it to be just barely tolerable with gritted teeth may also be infinitesimal. 
These feelings determine our reactions. So some might suggest that the difference in reaction 
from world to world is infinitesimal, but enough to make the difference about tolerability. I 
reply that a tolerable state of affairs may differ only infinitesimally from an intolerable, and 
one may dislike what one finds intolerable just infinitesimally more than one dislikes what 
one tolerates with gritted teeth. What must be large is the difference between reactions in 
a different dimension: what one judges when one judges something tolerable or judges it 
intolerable. In moral contexts this just is the difference between being permissible and being 
impermissible, and that is a very large difference indeed. But the moral difference is just the 
instantiation in this domain of the more general difference, which one can also find between 
e.g., the aesthetically tolerable (permissible) and intolerable (impermissible). 
62Craig, 464–465.
63GN, vii.
64Ibid., 407.
65Craig 468n9.
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I chose the phrase “candidate histories” with care. The histories in ques-
tion have at the point at which I call them candidates no modal status at 
all: they are candidates for possibility, not possible histories. Some make 
the grade. Some don’t. It remains true even of those that don’t that they 
are among the actual candidates for possibility—the ones actually consid-
ered—though they do not come out possible. It is also true on my view 
that in every possible world, God selects among just those that actually 
were candidates. Again, on my view, the correct logic of “broadly logical” 
modality is S5. Were it the case that God could have preferred this history 
impossible, there would be a possible world in which He did so. On my 
view, if He so preferred things, that is how they would be. So there would 
be a possible world in which it was impossible. Given S5, it would follow 
that this history is impossible. The upshot is that on my view, if a universe 
is physically possible, it is not the case that God could have preferred it to 
be “broadly logically” impossible. I never say otherwise. Craig ascribes to 
me a premise I do not hold, and which on my view is just false. In short, 
Craig’s criticisms of my views seem to me to fail completely.
Red Herring?
Craig thinks that given my concern with divine ultimacy, my book’s main 
brief should have been anti-Platonism, and that modal metaphysics was “a 
red herring.”66 A Platonism of necessary abstract entities present indepen-
dent of God is certainly incompatible with God’s being the sole ultimate 
reality; if they exist independent of God, they are at least as ultimate in 
the scheme of things as He. But suppose you want to avoid this. Platonic 
views are rife in modal metaphysics. There are good reasons for this; nec-
essary Platonic possible worlds, for instance, are tailored to the prevailing 
sort of modal semantics and to many modal and metaphysical intuitions. 
Modal metaphysics drives some to Platonism. Truly to avoid Platonism, 
one has to show that it shouldn’t. This is one reason the modal truth 
project isn’t a red herring. Modal truth is a door through which unsavory 
beasts may enter, and the book tries to nail it shut by providing some-
thing more appealing than Platonism in its place. Pace Craig, it is surely 
not the case that “once one has adopted divine psychologism [his name 
for my view of abstract entities], one need not offer any modal theory at 
all.”67 Theists concerned with divine ultimacy have to ward off threats by 
way of modal metaphysics regardless. Ignoring them won’t make them 
go away. You might, for instance, reject Platonism, find that you have no 
adequate modal metaphysics to put in its place, and rescind your rejec-
tion. Further, Craig’s red-herring claim ignores possibilism, another sort 
of view to which modal metaphysics might drive you even after you’ve 
rejected Platonism. Possibilism and Platonism get roughly equal space in 
my chapter on possible worlds. I discuss theist Platonism more than I do 
66Ibid., 469.
67Ibid.
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theist possibilism elsewhere in the book, but that is because it would be far 
easier for my view to collapse into theist Platonism than into theist pos-
sibilism, and theist Platonism is popular while theist possibilism is not.
Possibilism comes in two varieties, Lewis’s of existent and Meinon-
gians’ of non-existent objects. I show that theism can be conjoined with 
existent-object possibilism. Contra Craig,68 my doing so doesn’t entail that 
existent-object possibilism does not raise ultimacy concerns. Eternalist 
uncreated concrete existent merely possible objects modo Lewis would be 
as incompatible with sole divine ultimacy as eternalist uncreated concrete 
existent actual objects. For Lewis, there is no language-independent dis-
tinction between the two sorts—the only reason our world isn’t “merely” 
possible is that our purely-indexical word “actual” refers to it. So if the ac-
tual objects create a worry, the “merely” possible ones create the same one. 
What I show entails only that those concerns can be met—by showing that 
God can be the source of the full Lewis ontology, as I do.69 Turning to the 
other sort of possibilism, Craig writes that
neo-Meinongianism does not raise the ultimacy concerns that motivate 
Leftow’s project, since abstract objects do not exist on this view, making it a 
sort of nominalism.70
To back this, Craig quotes against me a formulation of my ultimacy con-
cerns on which they extend only to what exists, not to non-existents. The 
formulation Craig quotes has direct Biblical motivation. Biblical writers 
plainly did want to hold that no concrete existent was co-eternal with God 
or exists independent of Him. Nothing in the Bible suggests that they had 
Meinongian items in view, and as I was trying at that point to motivate 
my project out of Scripture, that was the most I could say at that point. But 
I also argue explicitly that theists simply shouldn’t be Meinongians. The 
reason I give is that on Meinongian views, modal truth has an ontology of 
non-existents, of which a God who can only cause existence can’t credibly 
be the source, and that therefore modal truth itself remains independent 
of God.71 That is, I bring up ultimacy concerns Meinongianism raises—the 
threat that we can’t trace back appropriately to God items in the onto-
logical census and obtaining states of affairs not due to created free agency 
or created random action—suggest that theists couldn’t deal with them, 
and infer that they should reject the view.
Further, Craig’s claim that on Meinongian views abstract objects don’t 
exist is technically correct but a bit misleading. Non-existent possibilia 
don’t exist, true. But they are part of the ontological census nonetheless. In 
Meinongian systems a special quantifier and the absolutely unrestricted 
universal quantifier range over them. Further, for Meinongians, they have 
68Ibid., 469n10.
69GN, 107–112.
70Ibid., 469n10.
71Ibid., 43–44.
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properties even though they do not exist. Things with properties can be 
sorted as abstract and concrete whether or not they exist. On standard 
accounts of the abstract/concrete distinction, Meinongian objects count 
as abstract: they are nowhere in spacetime, lack causal powers, etc.72 So 
Meinongian views have a full panoply of abstracta, though they are not 
versions of Platonism. (Platonic items exist.) On Meinongian views, the 
abstracta include possible worlds. So Meinongian abstracta provide a full 
non-theist modal ontology, and they would be a realm of which God is 
not the source.
I argue that theists should hold that God is the source of all modal on-
tology, including abstracta if any.73 As Meinongian items count as abstract 
and threaten to have a role in modal ontology, the very arguments I give 
to motivate my approach to abstracta in modal ontology extend to them.74 
So does the more general ultimacy concern that drives the book: that ev-
erything should trace back to God in the end. So I do not think a concern 
with possibilism was misplaced in the book, or that modal metaphysics is 
a red herring for theists with divine ultimacy on their minds. Of course, if 
one rejects Platonism and possibilism, one is left with the question of what 
modal ontology to put in their place. I argue that theists have distinctive 
and attractive resources to answer that question.75
       Oriel College
72They also “are” (in the Meinongian way) horses, cars, etc. They are at once abstract and 
concrete, then: but Meinongians can avoid contradiction here with machinery they have in 
their views for independent reasons, i.e., either their distinction between nuclear and non-
nuclear properties (so Terence Parsons) or their distinction between two sorts of copula (e.g., 
Zalta’s distinction between that of exemplification and that of encoding).
73GN, 102, 106. 
74GN, 60–65.
75My thanks to Chris Tweedt for discussion. I’ve kept the text to responses to criticism. But 
let me here just register puzzlement with two other bits of Craig’s review. He says in response 
to my brief treatment of conventionalism that “conventionalism [holds] that there is no fact 
of the matter concerning the existence of abstract objects” (469). The only conventionalism 
I discuss is modal. Modal conventionalism makes no claim for or against the existence of 
abstract objects, or about whether their existence is a matter of fact. It merely offers a theory 
of the genesis of modal truth, which if true would eliminate one reason to posit abstracta. I’m 
puzzled too at Craig’s statement that “a deflationary nominalism would avoid . . . ontological 
commitment to . . . truths themselves . . . taking the truth predicate to be merely a device of 
semantic ascent, a way of talking about a proposition P rather than asserting that P” (469). 
If deflationary nominalists take themselves to be talking about propositions, they believe in 
propositions, which if true are truths. On one point about conventionalism, though, Craig 
has caught me out. He notes that I at one point call this a “no ontology” view and says that 
it would be better classed as what I call a “safe ontology” view (470). He’s right—and in the 
book’s only discussion of conventionalism, that is how I class it (GN, 67). A more charitable 
critic might have noted this.
